[Preliminary program]

**Wednesday, 10th September, 2014**

8:30 - 9:00: **Welcome coffee & registration**

9:00 - 09:50: **Aggregating Tastes, Beliefs, and Attitudes under Uncertainty** - Jean-Marc Tallon (Paris School of Economics)

09:50 - 10:40: **Reference Points and Learning** - Alan Beggs (Oxford University)

10:40 - 11:10: **Coffee break**

11:10 - 12:00: **Reconciling Kinked and Smooth Approaches to Ambiguity** - Mohammed Abdelaoui (HEC)

12:00 - 1:30pm: **Lunch break**

1:30 - 2:20pm: **Entropy and Memory** - Ron Peretz (LSE)

2:20 – 3:10pm: **Evidence based Mechanisms** - Eduardo Perez (Ecole Polytechnique)

3:10 - 3:40 pm: **Coffee break**

3:40 – 4:30pm: **Projection Equilibrium** – Kristof Madarasz (LSE)

4:30 – 5:20pm: **Fair Management of Social Risk** – Stéphane Zuber (Paris School of Economics)
Thursday, 11th September, 2014

8:30 - 9:00: Welcome coffee & registration

9:00 - 09:50: Stable Observable Behavior – Yuval Heller (Oxford University)

09:50 - 10:40: Repeated Games with Public Information Revisited – Marie Laclau (Paris School of Economics)

10:40 - 11:10: Coffee break

11:10 - 12:00: Markov Perfect Equilibria in Revision Games – Tristan Tomala (HEC)

12:00 - 1:30pm: Lunch break

1:30 - 2:20pm: The Dynamics of Social Influence – Bary Pradelski (Oxford University)

2:20 – 3:10pm: A Belief-based Theory of Homophily – Willemien Kets (NWU)

3:10 - 3:40 pm: Coffee break

3:40 – 4:30pm: Geometry, auctions, matching and the existence of equilibrium with indivisibilities – Elisabeth Baldwin (LSE)

Friday, 12th September, 2014

8:30 - 9:00: Welcome coffee & registration

9:00 - 09:50: On Dynamics in Composite Congestion Games – Cheng Wan (Oxford University)

09:50 - 10:40: Peer Influence, Beliefs and Segregation with an Application to State/Private Education – Ronny Razin (LSE)

10:40 - 11:10: Coffee break


12:00 - 1:30pm: Lunch break
1:30 - 2:20pm: When Olson Meets Dahl... From Inefficient Group Formation to Inefficient Political Process – Perrin Lefebvre (Paris School of Economics)

2:20 – 3:10pm: Information Aggregation in Markets for Vote – Peter Eso (Oxford University)

3:10 - 3:40 pm: Coffee break

3:40 – 4:30pm: Nash Equilibrium in Games with Quasi-Monotonic Best-Responses – Luciano de Castro (NWU)

INFORMATION

Organizers: Olivier Gossner - Frédéric Koessler – Nicolas Jacquemet.

Administrative contact: Paris School of Economics, Claire Saint-Léger, email: Claire.saint-leger@psemail.eu


Registration: https://adobeformscentral.com/?f=Sapomnlk9LhiygruXU0-8Q

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